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 The relation between microeconomics and macroeconomics has been 
stormy, in the sense that the subject has been ignored, discovered, settled and 
ignored again. Indeed, such relation is one of the most intriguing topics in 
contemporary economic theory. For some thirty years, economics has been 
embroiled in a complex controversy regarding the microfoundations of 
macrotheory, and many in the mainstream of the profession have become 
fascinated with the notion that macrotheory must be based on explicit and sound 
microfoundations. While many mainstream economists have been working full-
time on microfoundations of macrotheory, non-mainstream economists replied that 
it is microtheory that is in need of a sound macrofoundation. Not surprisingly, little 
has been definitely settled. But, however tiresome inconclusive controversies tend 
to become, we cannot merely walk away from this one, for a variety of issues of 
great relevance crucially depend for their resolution on coming to a satisfactory 
understanding of the foundations of macroeconomics as an autonomous discipline.  
This paper is predicated upon the notion that any attempt to make some sense 
of the microfoundations issue involves taking methodology as the most appropriate 
level for getting on the road in the task of opening what seems to be a Pandora’s 
Box. It is an unfortunate aspect of contemporary economics that methodological 
discourses are denigrated, for they are indispensable to the progress of any science. 
The perennial complaint that ‘Those who can, do; those who can’t, pontificate on 
method’ is simply false, for the very reason that those economists who criticize 
methodological discourses usually engage in just that in their efforts to banish such 
supposedly undesirable activity from the discipline 
Our purpose in this paper is to argue for the relative epistemological 
autonomy of macroeconomics with respect to micro reasoning, thus arguing 
against the vain attempt to reduce macro to microtheory, which is implied in the 
search for an all-encompassing microfounding framework. The endurance of two 
separated fields in economic theory - macro and micro - is no accident, and it does 
not derive from the definitional truth that while the former deals with aggregates, 
the latter is concerned with individual units. Such distinction in fact derives from 
their use of two different methods: while micro employs primarily a logical-
deductive reasoning, macro uses mainly a historical-inductive one.  
We do not intend to criticize neoclassical theory as such, but only its 
insistence on unifying economic theory according to a single and all-encompassing 
model. Indeed, this is an arrogant epistemological temptation into which 
neoclassical economists have not been falling alone, for some Marxist  or 
Keynesian economists often adopt such a stance as well. When doing that, 
however, they gloss over the  complex, contradictory and continuously changing 




This paper is organized as follows. Section I details what is meant here by 
macrotheory using a historical-inductive method and microtheory following a 
logical-deductive one. After looking at some implications of such methodological 
dissonance for the microfoundations debate, we argue that the notion that sound 
microfoundations necessarily means one provided within a single microfounding 
framework, be it neoclassical or not, is a blinkered view. Section II details the role 
played by inductivism and deductivism in the split between macro and micro and 
the distinction between methodological individualism and methodological holism, 
this being done with a view to support our contention regarding the imperative of 
approaching the microfoundations issue from a relativistic and thus pluralistic 
perspective. In  arguing that way, we follow the so-called Babylonian tradition 
described by Dow (1985), while the search for a single microfounding framework 
is a Cartesian-Euclidean dream. Section III is intended to argue that implicit in the 
Keynesian revolution, interpreted here as an attempt by Keynes to convert 
macroeconomics into an autonomous discipline, is in fact the emancipation of 
macroanalysis from a single, time-invariant microfounding framework. We argue 
that underlying Keynes’ macro project is the same plea for relativism and thus 
pluralism as regards the microfundations issue that we suggest in this paper. 
Section IV then poses the question of to what extent macrotheories really need 
microfoundations in order to have epistemological validity. Finally, Section V is 
intended to suggest that coherent and sound microfoundations can be provided, 
logically speaking, by alternative microfounding frameworks, thus showing that 
the neoclassical plea for a single, all-encompassing  framework cannot be seen as a 
value-free one. 
Before proceeding further, a caveat is required. In this paper, when we speak 
of microeconomics, we are just refering to standard neoclassical theory, as it 
appears in mainstream microeconomics textbooks or, in a more elaborated and 
abstratc form, in the general equilibrium analysis of the Arrow-Debreu type.
1 We 
are excluding from the the concept more recent developmments the working of 
imperfect markets, that are cruccially dependent on empirical research. On the 
other hand, we see macroeconomics as a theory that derives from Keynes original 
contribution.
2  
I. What are we really looking for in this Pandora’s Box? 
Inductivism and deductivism have played a considerable role in  the split 
between microeconomics and macroeconomics. This fracture arises from their 
                                           
1- For instance, Varian (@). 




employing different ways of reasoning, microtheory being essentially logical-
deductive, whilst macrotheory is more inductively and historically inclined.
3 In this 
sense, a main contention we wish to make is that the idea that sound 
microfoundations for macrotheory means one provided within a single, time-
invariant microfounding framework is a blinkered view. It is because macrotheory 
employs mainly a historical-inductive method that the very attribute of soundness 
of a given microfounding framework for marcro has an inescapably relativistic, 
historical nature nature. Different is the case of microtheory: since it follows 
mainly a logical-deductive method, it can afford having a single starting point: the 
individual maximization hypothesis. What we disagree with is not the desirability 
of providing macroeconomic results with sound microfoundations. Even though 
they are not necessarily fundamental to validate those results, since they can be 
made to stand on their own, without the need of showing that they have a definite 
connection with a predetermined individual behavior.  
The difference in methods imply different ways of viewing the same reality. 
When neoclassical economics looks for a universal and invariant microfounding 
framework, it falls in an old positivist temptation: to find a unique logic for the 
whole economic system. From a relativistic standpoint, that we share, it is the 
notion of an invariant framework for microfounding macroeconomics that lacks 
sound logical foundations. It is neither necessary nor desirable nor possible to 
develop a single, overarching microfounding framework, which can support all 
macro reasoning. For there are different ways of microfounding macroanalysis, 
with different strengths and weaknesses, and suitable to different contexts. Such 
multiplicity does not mean that these different ways of microfounding turn out not 
to be economics, for it does not violate the common method derived from the 
inherent logic of the subject. For instance, neoclassical economists would not deny 
that maximizing behavior does not take place in a vacuum, but rather has to have a 
setting or structure. In neoclassical analysis, whose central methodological dictate 
is that all explanation of economic phenomena must be reduced to the maximizing 
behavior of economic agents, this is provided by the traditional assumptions about 
firms and individuals, in a competitive environment, where the technologies 
available to the firms and the preferences of the individuals are to be treated as 
given. The endowments of factors then provide the initial conditions within that 
setting, and rational maximizing is the assumed mode of behavior on the part of the 
individuals that leads to a solution condition which is market-clearing. But as Nell 
                                           
3 - After having written a first version of this paper, we came to found out that a similar suggestion had already been 
made in passing by Pheby (1988, p. 20), to whom the split that exists between micro and macroeconomics is 
partially explained by their employing different ways of obtaining results, micro being essentially deductive, while 




and Semmler (1991) correctly noted, purged from their normative content (the 
specifics) this hardly gives a picture of neoclassical analysis alone, for it also 
provides a summary of virtually any analytical approach to an economic issue: the 
setting must be specified by identifying the agents, the knowledge available to 
them, the social pressures, their goals and desires, the characteristics of the 
technology, and so on. Then the initial conditions will be spelled out, with the 
assumed mode of behavior by individuals coming next and then, given these, one 
will try to develop the most appropriate kind of analysis, based on suitable 
conditions for solutions. In other words, what the differences in methods between 
micro and macro really rules out is not the possibility of alternative 
microfoundations, but rather the naive idea that constrained choice, maximizing 
behavior is the only logical way of microfounding macroanalysis. What we dispute 
is thus not only the possibility of having a single, all-encompassing microfounding 
framework, but also the notion that that framework should be based on maximizing 
behavior precisely because microanalysis follows a logical-deductive method. 
Following Nell and Semmler (1991), we would argue that the theorizing 
procedure just sketched above is in fact followed by any economic analysis, not 
just by neoclassical economics. It starts by identifying a set of agents engaged in 
economic activity, giving some form to their desires, goals, knowledge and 
abilities. These agents may be rational individuals, but they could equally be firms 
driven by institutional goals, or social classes. They may maximize, and if they do 
they could maximize growth instead of profits, or they could pursue multiple goals. 
Or they could follow other types of behavior such as adaptative behavior, routines, 
imitation, conventions or institutionally determined rules. Even though it is almost 
consensual that firms aim to make profits, the problem with the neoclassical 
approach is that it translates this profit criterion into profit maximization. But as 
institutionalists and behaviorists like Simon (1976) have been stressing, the 
complexity of decision problems as well as the fact that firms are made up of many 
different individuals with different interests and different views about the 
environment and the constraints facing the firm do invalidate the notion of 
maximization, so that decision-making is better conceived in terms of satisficing: 
decisions are reached in accordance with a set of routines and only if outcomes fall 
short of aspiration levels will there be an attempt to reassess and eventually 
improve the routines. Thus, there is no reason why macrotheory must be 
necessarily based on profit maximization, even if it is believed that firms are 
guided by the profit motive.
4 
                                           
4 Moreover, the defense of firm maximization based the notion that there is some form of selection that weeds out 
firms that do not behave as if they maximize, cannot be defended on purely logical grounds, for one can conceive of 




Neoclassicism, therefore, is just a particular way of filling in a general 
format of microfounding framework. Altogether different - even contradictory - 
specifications can easily be set up, and some will clearly be more applicable to 
some macroeconomic explanations. A Post Keynesian approach would take 
households, divided into social classes, and oligopolistic business firms operating 
given techniques as the setting, with given autonomous spending as the initial 
conditions. The mode of behavior assumed is that agents will follow sensible rules, 
given by tradition, custom or routines governing induced expenditures, and the 
purpose will be to determine the equilibrium in spending, as influenced by relative 
shares. This may be long run or short run, but it will normally be a demand 
equilibrium; there need be no binding supply constraints. No form of maximizing 
behavior is assumed, and no factor endowments need be considered among the 
initial conditions. Nor is market-clearing required for equilibrium, for the 
'injections=withdrawals' condition balances the inducements and inhibitions on 
spending, and this need say nothing about market supplies or utilization of factors. 
The familiar Keynesian macro equality between leakages and injections is fully 
compatible with any specification about micro behavior, and it is logically possible 
to microfound the macro identity between investment and saving with a variety of 
alternative assumptions about the behavior of micro units, for such identity is valid 
irrespective of any specification about micro behavior. There is nothing 
intrinsically specific about the alternative way of microfounding just described that 
renders it logically inconsistent, for it does not violate any soundness condition 
spelled out on purely logical terms. Obviously, it violates the soundness condition 
spelled out in the neoclassical prescription. But on purely logical grounds, there is 
nothing intrinsically problematic about a microfounding framework which neglects 
the determination of prices in the neoclassical fashion of supply and demand in 
perfectly competitive markets. 
A Classical or Classical-Marxian approach, in turn, would take technology 
and social classes as the setting, the labor force, or its growth, and capital funds as 
the initial conditions, assume an institutionally specific form of behavior by 
capitalists, and the following of customary spending rules by households. It would 
then determine the various possible comparative static equilibria of prices, the rate 
of profits, wages, and also growth rates, relative industry sizes and consumption, 
on the basis of a reproduction condition. Once again, no market clearing is 
involved, no individual maximizing takes place, and there are no binding supply-
side constraints. We could then perform analytical exercises such as comparative 
statics or steady-state dynamics, such exercises having no intrinsic neoclassical 
                                                                                                                                        
efficient from some global standpoint (Nelson and Winter 1982; Iway 1984; Hodgson 1990). A fuller discussion of 




content, this being so for the pedestrian reason that there is nothing intrinsically 
neoclassical about the solution and dynamic properties of a system of economic 
equations. In any case, neither of these alternative macro models would draw on 
individual rational maximizing, for both would see behavior as being strongly 
influenced by institutions and liable to change in the course of time. Neither would 
assume market clearing, nor do factor endowment scarcities would play any 
significant role. Notwithstanding, both would follow the general format for a 
macroeconomic analysis endowed with logically sound microfoundations. 
Thus, neoclassicism is just a specific instance of the general format for 
building a macromodel with logically sound microfoundations. Unlike the 
mainstream view, for which the micro-macro bifurcation is rectifiable only within 
the narrow limits of the constrained choice, maximizing behavior framework, we 
sustain that that bifurcation is primarily methodological. The adoption of an 
invariant, with respect to time and space, framework is only possible in 
neoclassical microtheory, whose method employed is primarily logical-deductive; 
in the realm of macrotheory as such, whose method used is mainly historical-
inductive, where researchers look rather for regularities that are historically 
determined, such attempt is inescapably vain. To say it another way, the 
methodological chasm between macro and micro renders the search for the 
microfoundations of macroeconomics self-defeating, in the sense that the distinct 
logic of their underlying methodologies renders the building of the microfounding 
framework a mythical dream. It is in this sense that we refer to the methodological 
dissonance between micro and macro as being at the root of the impossibility of 
deriving a single, trans-historical microfounding framework. We can developed the 
specifics of an open microfounding framework we need, as we need it, for 
particular issues, basing our analysis on the actual stylized facts of the setting and 
the initial conditions, and assuming the incentives and motivations that are actually 
called for by the rules of the game. In a sense, each macro paradigm builds its own 
notion of microfoundation, this being one of the reasons that makes ours a 
relativistic and thus pluralistic position as regards the microfoundations issue.  
We do not dispute that macroeconomics deals with relations that are, at least 
in principle, deducible from the actions of individual agents; rather, what we 
wonder is how necessary, to an understanding of those relations, is to start from 
individual actions. This is not the method employed by macroeconomists. They 
rather inductively observe macro phenomena, pay careful attention to the new 
historical facts that changed the macro relations, compare the facts with the 
existing theory, and derive new hypothesis and models. Only afterwards they will 
search for microfoundations, and the latter in most cases turn out to be partially ad 




microtheory. We feel that it is counterproductive to claim that only one 
microfounding framework is able to provide macrotheories with sound 
foundations; indeed, the search for a microfounding framework for all seasons (and 
lands) does not make much sense. But the diversity of methods in question does 
not mean that we should give up making serious efforts to provide macrotheory 
with sound microfoundations, provided that means searching for greater 
consistency between the two disciplines. What we disagree with is the charge of 
non-scientificity and emptiness raised against any contribution that lacks proper 
microfoundations in the neoclassical sense, i.e. as a reduction to microtheory. 
Sound microfoundations do not necessarily mean foundations in the theory 
of individual behavior, but rather a consistent account of how microbehavior 
affects, and it affected by, macrobehavior. The need for microfoundations should 
not be interpreted in a narrow and a-historic manner. Neoclassical economists often 
regard alternative microfounding frameworks as too woolly and imprecise as well 
as lacking in choice-theoretic foundations. However, they should consider the fact 
that preferences and utility, for instance, are not easy to measure either. Even 
though we may have become socialized into reasoning in terms of well-defined 
preference orderings, the latter are by no means easier to identify in the real world 
than, for instance, monopoly power orderings. Besides, once we allow for learning, 
habit formation and social and institutional influences, then the historical 
contingency of the neoclassical microfounding framework is made clear, thus 
rendering problematic its choice-theoretic basis. 
As Solow (1985) himself suspected, the attempt to construct economics as an 
axiomatically based hard science is doomed to fail, the main reason being that 
economics is a social science. In his view, the end product of economic analysis is 
likely to be a collection of models contingent on society’s circumstances and on 
the historical context, and not a single monolithic model for all seasons. 
Economists should set themselves the task of modeling particular contingent social 
circumstances, which means they should be conscious of the fact that different 
social contexts may call for different background assumptions and therefore for 
different models. Economists should recognize that the validity of an economic 
model may well depend on the social context. Since the proper choice of a model 
depends on the institutional context, few  things should be more interesting to a 
civilized economic theorist than the opportunity to observe the interplay between 
social institutions and economic behavior over time and place.
5 
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Solow wrote: “My impression is that the best and brightest in the profession proceed as if economics is the physics 




In other words, what we dispute is not the desirability of providing 
macrotheories with microfoundations whenever it is required, but rather the 
demand for microfoundations which is not accompanied by a similar claim for 
proper macrofoundations for microtheories. For to take the preliminary steps 
towards a real synthesis between micro and macro it is necessary consider not only 
the microfoundations of macrotheory, but the macrofoundations of microtheory as 
well. From a methodological point of view there seem to be no decisive arguments 
which would support the need of a single, universal microfounding (or 
macrofounding, for that matter) framework. Microtheory and macrotheory have 
different perspectives, research targets and employ distinct methods, so that no 
single microfounding framework can claim methodological priority over any other. 
In this sense, what we dispute is the notion that any macrotheoretical statement that 
cannot be immediately reduced to neoclassical microtheory should be rejected as 
hopelessly unsound. For to argue that good macrotheory should have a micro 
dimension, in the sense that there should be a correspondence between macro 
outcomes and micro behavior, does not imply that constrained choice is necessarily 
the best device. 
Micro and macro are not irrevocably incompatible bedfellows, but it is 
misleading to insist that an adequate explanation of how micro phenomena 
constrain a macromodel must necessarily be based upon a constrained choice 
framework. What is logically incompatible is not macro and micro as such, but the 
specificities of their methods, on the one hand, and the search for an invariant 
framework for providing such microfoundations, on the other hand. We are not 
disputing their compatibility on epistemological grounds, but only the mainstream 
idea that there is only one framework within which such microfounding can be 
consistently carried out. It is only in the neoclassical microfoundations literature, 
which rests on the shared view of microeconomists that economics is a study of 
constrained choice in a variety of circumstances, that the attribute of logical 
soundness is conceived in a narrow sense. Indeed, the microfoundations project is 
inherent to the neoclassical project, particularly to its reductionist methodological 
framework. Once we adopt a broader sense for microfoundations, the normative 
claim that unless they are provided according to neoclassical requirements, no 
microfoundations at all have been provided, becomes simply nonsensical.   
II. What are some of the methodological first principles? 
                                                                                                                                        
the belief that there is one true model and that it can be discovered or imposed if only you will make the proper 




The alternative use of inductivism and deductivism has played an important 
role in the split between microeconomics and macroeconomics. This 
methodological fracture arises from their employing different ways of reasoning, 
microtheory being essentially logical-deductive, whilst macrotheory is more 
inductively and historically inclined. This is no mere matter of differences in 
emphasis, for these two methodological approaches have very different ideas as to 
how knowledge can be acquired, thus rendering them not always compatible or 
implying either that they are not naturally compatible or that an eventual 
compatibility is subject to certain specific conditions. 
 Deduction involves applying logic to some general law, or axiom, possibly 
in conjunction with some initial conditions, to derive particular theorems. 
Induction, in turn, starts at the other end of the chain; particular conjunction of 
events are observed to occur and, if these conjunctions are taken to be causally 
connected (and expressed as theorems), logic is applied to work backward towards 
the axioms (Dow 1985). Inductivism and deductivism are therefore two extreme 
methodological positions. Inductivism, which is a view most closely associated 
with the work of Sir Francis Bacon in the early 1600s, stresses observation and 
systematic statistical work as the most adequate route to knowledge. Deductivism, 
in turn, which is an approach most closely associated with the work of René 
Descartes in the early 1600s, emphasizes thought and introspection. While 
deductive arguments tend to move from general to particular statements, induction 
involves reasoning from particular statements towards more general ones (Pheby 
1988).  
Even though few economists can be classified as fully fledged inductivists or 
deductivists, we would argue that while macrotheory ultimately employs a 
inductive method, microtheory essentially employs a deductive one. Truly enough, 
inductivism and deductivism are not employed solely by macrotheorists and 
microtheorists, respectively. However, while macrotheory is primarily induction-
guided, microtheory is essentially deduction-guided. They use a great deal of these 
ways of reasoning by the nature of their research agenda. Neoclassical 
microtheory, for instance, is essentially deductive, in the sense that it starts from a 
well-defined particular assumption, namely, agents rationally maximize their 
interests in a market where competition prevails. From this basic assumption it is 
then able to fully develop a sophisticated model of how a market-coordinated 
economy optimally allocate resources. The neoclassical microtheorist may 
eventually check his or her model with reality along the way. But, if we further 
assume that the model maintains its logical consistency, when reality does not 
conform with it, the discrepancy will have to be explained by the distortions in the 




Methodological sciences such as mathematics and logics are also essentially 
logical-deductive. Among the substantive sciences, however, no discipline is as 
extremely deductive as neoclassical microtheory. Physicists and biologists usually 
employ deductive reasoning, but they do that in a limited way, for they cannot 
assume aprioristically that atoms or molecules are fully rational; they can develop 
theories that predict their behavior only after inductively observing regularities in 
controlled experiments. Neoclassical microtheory, in turn, takes it as axiomatic that 
fully rational agents can, should and need behave in a maximizing way. 
The fact that micro and macrotheory use primarily different methods does 
not mean that these two ways of reasoning should be regarded as being necessarily 
mutually exclusive, for this would imply an inherent micro-macro incompatibility. 
For instance, we can devise syllogisms where deductive arguments may involve 
general statements in both premises and conclusions, and inductive arguments that 
contain general statements and conclude with a particular one. Besides, there are 
no facts without deductive theory, in the sense that the mere classification of events 
require a taxonomy based on some deductive reasoning.  
As Pheby (1988) pointed out, a distinction needs to be drawn between 
inductivism and induction, on the one hand, and between deductivism and 
deduction, on the other hand. While inductivism is a broad way of approaching 
scientific work, induction can and often does play an important part in this 
approach. Hence, the use of induction is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
be an inductivist, so that an economist may employ induction without feeling the 
need to embrace the complete inductivist package. In turn, deduction, whether 
axiomatic or mathematical, can be employed in a manner designed to facilitate, 
ultimately, statistical analysis and testing. However, deductivists tend to believe 
that statistical and empirical knowledge is so transitory that it is of little worth, 
deductive analysis thus providing greater understanding. Even though deductivists 
do not necessarily ignore empirical evidence, they treat it as nothing more than an 
illustration of deductive argument. 
It is worthy of mention that the historical nature of macroeconomics has been 
recognized even within mainstream circles. For instance, the twin concepts of path-
dependence and hysteresis have been used in recent macrotheory to underline the 
notion that the tendency of macro variables is not independent of their own history. 
The notion of hysteresis attempts to conceptualize the traces left by the past in the 
variable values produced by an economic system. Hysteresis arises when the 
variable values created by a macro system depend, in addition to its relations and 
parameters, on the history of those values. In a paper on hysteresis in 
unemployment, Blanchard and Summers (1987) show that the European 




alternative theory embodying the idea that the equilibrium (natural) unemployment 
rate depends on the history of the actual unemployment rate. Since the natural 
value of the  unemployment rate is path-dependent, history really matters.
6 
Moreover, there is no umbilical association between methodological 
individualism and the recurrent neoclassical plea for a single microfounding 
framework. First of all, a distinction should be made between ontological 
individualism and methodological  individualism. While the former asserts the 
true, but trivial, proposition that ultimate social reality consists solely of acting 
individuals, the latter maintains that the only genuine scientific explanations are 
those that are reducible to individualist explanations. Even though we do not 
dispute the former proposition, to reject a macrotheory on the grounds of its 
incompatibility with a predetermined kind of individual behavior, be it maximizing 
or not, is a serious epistemological slip. The methodological individualism 
underlying the neoclassical approach means that it is to the individualistic method - 
analysis of the decisions of individuals - that we owe whatever understanding of 
economic phenomena we possess. It is believed that neither aggregates nor 
averages do act upon one another, so that it will never be possible to establish 
necessary connections of cause and effect between them as we can between 
individual phenomena such as individual prices. Methodological individualism is a 
methodological statement asserting that economists should explain aggregate 
relationships in terms of the behavior of individual agents.  
A holistic view of the economy, on the other hand, is one in which the 
behavior of the whole economy is more than a simple aggregate of individuals’ 
behavior. Methodological holism means that there are entities that cannot be 
reduced to individual dispositions such as institutions, social structures and 
climates of opinion. These holistic entities exist independently of individual wills 
and are taken for granted when individuals act. Therefore, holistic entities can be 
causal factors that transform individual dispositions into dependent variables. Even 
though individual choices and preferences should not be necessarily denied, they 
are severely limited by the existing institutions, social norms, socioeconomic 
classes, and even macroeconomic events. In such a case, the definition of 
individual preferences is not sufficient to allow us to understand macroeconomic 
behavior. As Arrow (1994) himself recently recognized, the use of social 
categories is of absolute logical necessity when doing economic analysis, in the 
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(1990). See also the minisymposium on hysteresis in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (JPKE 1993) for 
papers dealing with the implications of the hysteresis concept for theoretical and predictive purposes, particularly 
with its relevance to an understanding of economic processes where economic events occur in a historical context 




sense that social variables, not attached to particular individuals, are essential in 
studying the economy.  
Moreover, methodological individualism does not necessarily imply the 
search for a single, maximization-based microfounding framework. The Austrian 
approach, for instance, clearly demonstrates that an individualistic world view is 
logically compatible with a non-neoclassical microfounding framework, thus 
supporting the relativistic and thus pluralistic position advocated in this paper.  To 
put it metaphorically, methodological individualism is not a road that leads 
exclusively to neoclassicism, so that those who favor an individualistic world view 
do not have to place all their bets in neoclassical horses. More precisely, even those 
economists who have a strong revealed preference for methodological 
individualism are freed from seeing a single, maximization-based structure as the 
only acceptable one in their search for a consistent and coherent, logically 
speaking, microfounding framework. Even though the Austrian school in fact faces 
a microfoundations problem which is at best solved (or at most avoided) by means 
of eschewing macroanalysis altogether, in the sense that microeconomics is 
conceived as coterminous with economics, it provides a logically consistent 
counterexample to the necessary association of sound microfoundations with 
maximizing behavior. 
Unlike neoclassical economists, Austrians are more intrigued by the dynamic 
and unpredictable change inherent in markets than by the stability that makes 
equilibrium models appealing tools of analysis. They provide a counter-example to 
the necessary association between an emphasis on methodological individualism 
and the focus on a constrained-maximization microfounding framework; even if 
one concedes that methodological individualism is the best route to an 
understanding of economic phenomena, a constrained-maximization structure does 
not emerge naturally as the most adequate microfounding framework. As Vaughn 
(1994) put it, even though neoclassical economists could also argue that they are 
theorizing about the human pursuit of projects and plans within the known 
environment when they model choice as constrained maximization, Austrians are 
likely to claim that constrained maximization is too narrow a framework to capture 
the kinds of action that they take to be distinctly human. Human action involves 
typical economizing behavior, to be sure, but it also involves breaking out known 
constraints and discovering new ways of doing things and new wants to satisfy. In 
fact, the whole Austrian emphasis on uncertainty is linked to a concern with the 
limitations of knowledge and the way human beings overcome those limitations. In 
this view, the fact that knowledge is multifaceted, heterogeneous and disaggregated 
is one of the driving features of market processes. Even though Austrians agree 




their purposes, the fact that human action takes place in time and always under 
conditions of partial ignorance about the present and total ignorance about the 
future implies that a consistent theory of market processes can be neither static nor 
based on the assumption of perfect knowledge.
7 
The imperative of approaching micro and macrotheory in a different way, 
and so, approaching the microfoundations issue from a relativistic and thus 
pluralistic perspective, follows the so-called Babylonian tradition described by 
Dow (1985). For Dow, the two modes of thought that have been governing 
intellectual inquiries can be referred to as Cartesian-Euclidean and Babylonian, by 
mode of thought being meant the way in which theories are constructed and 
presented, and how we attempt to convince others of the validity or truth of our 
arguments. The Cartesian-Euclidean tradition argues that all theorizing can be done 
using one unified framework. The Babylonian tradition, in turn, believes that 
economics pertains to a vast area of knowledge which, given the bounded 
rationality of the analyst and the present state of theory, cannot be analyzed in 
terms of one model. Models are by their very nature special cases, rather than 
being relevant for the whole universe of discourse.  
The Cartesian-Euclidean mode of thought involves establishing basic 
axioms, which are either true by definition or self-evident, and using deductive 
logic to derive theorems, which are not self-evident. Dow uses the term Cartesian-
Euclidean very broadly, to include all scientific thought influenced by the ideal of 
closed systems of axiomatic logic. In economics, for instance, the axioms of 
consumer rationality allow a wide range of theorems to be derived by deductive 
logic. In Dow’s view, the application of this axiomatic approach to generating 
knowledge has fostered reductionism (or atomism) as a distinctive feature of this 
mode of thought. Because the entire logical structure depends on the basic axioms, 
it is important to make them as widely acceptable as possible, i.e. as close as 
possible an approximation to being self-evident. As a consequence, propositions 
are broken down into their smallest components, such that one set of axioms can be 
identified from which all propositions can be derived by means of deduction. 
Within economics, reductionism requires that basic axioms refers to the smallest 
unit of inquiry, i.e. the individual.  
The Babylonian approach, in turn, rather than using a linear system of logical 
deduction from basic axioms, starts from the view that it is impossible in general to 
establish watertight axioms and points to the way in which axiomatic error is 
compounded by each link in the deductive chain of logic. The alternative approach 
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is to employ several strands of argument which have different starting points and 
which, in a successful theory, reinforce each other; any argument, therefore, does 
not stand or fall on the acceptability of any one set of axioms. Knowledge is 
generated by practical applications of theories as examples, using a variety of 
methods. In this approach, some phenomena are seen as so complex that it is 
inconceivable that human minds could capture it in a complete system of deductive 
logic. But this does not mean that Babylonian thought disregards logic. Rather, 
logic is applied within partial systems, which means that two lines of argument 
may have conflicting assumptions or conclusions, but the conflict is not a logical 
one for it simply reflects different choices as to which part of the system is chosen 
for inquiry. Since the ability to agree on any one set of axioms is doubted within 
the Babylonian approach, there is no particular incentive to make the axioms as 
narrow as possible. Indeed, since Babylonian arguments can draw on a range of 
facets of a system, it is more useful to focus on the nature of the system as a whole. 
Rather than being reductionist or atomistic, therefore, this approach is holistic. 
While a Cartesian-Euclidean system of thought is bound together by the set of 
axioms from which all theorems are derived, Babylonian thought is holistic in the 
sense that the binding factor of theories is a perception of how the system as a 
whole works. Different bodies of theory will reflect different choices as to which 
facets of the system to concentrate on, derived from different perceptions as to how 
the system works, no one body of theory purporting to present a complete, closed 
system. It is in this sense that our plea for a relativistic and thus pluralistic 
approach to the microfoundations issue can be seen as closely following the 
Babylonian tradition.  
From a relativistic and thus pluralistic perspective, there are several kinds of 
macroeconomics, each requiring its own microfoundations, thus rendering totally 
delusive the search for a single, time-invariant microfounding framework. 
Methodological tolerance is thus required, for there exist several macrotheories, 
alternative visions of how economies work, grounded on alternative sets of 
microeconomic foundations. It is the methodological dissonance between 
microtheory and macrotheory that is at the root of the need for relativism and thus 
pluralism as far as microfoundational issues are concerned. As Feyerabend (1975) 
cogently put it, some freedom from single and narrow methodological 
prescriptions has often proved to be an essential precondition for new insights and 
the advent of new theories, and this is no less true for the natural sciences than for 
the social sciences. The search for a single, all-encompassing microfounding 
framework is therefore deleterious to scientific progress in economics.  
Indeed, the search for the microfounding framework (be it neoclassical or 




is worth stressing that even though constrained maximization is the core of the 
imitation of physics by neoclassical economics, we would suggest that the lesson 
to be drawn from the physics of this century, in particular from the quantum 
mechanics developed by Max Planck, is that it is futile to search for a single, 
unified theory incorporating micro and macro phenomena.
8 As Mirowski (1989) so 
cogently showed, the hard core of neoclassical theory is the adaptation of mid-
nineteenth century physics as a rigid paradigm, and that hard core has been 
preserved and nourished throughout the twentieth century, even after physics has 
moved onwards to new metaphors and new techniques. To a quantum phycisist, for 
instance, the universe is an inseparable web of vibrating energy patterns in which 
no individual component has reality independently of the entirety, which led Hsieh 
and Ye (1991) to suggest that since the world is a collection of quantum 
mechanical systems, this is analogous to the microfoundations of macroeconomics. 
However, their conclusion that macrotheory will be standing on shifting sands if it 
does not have firm microfoundations, does not necessarily follow. And even 
granted it followed, it hardly implies that it is feasible to search for a single theory 
unifying both micro and macro.
9  
It must be recognized that neoclassicism already has well-developed 
responses to indictments of maximization such as processing information is costly, 
perfect knowledge is unrealistic, maximization ignores firms’ decision-making 
structures, and so forth. In an often-cited methodological argument regarding the 
futility of criticizing the maximization hypothesis, Boland (1981) admits that 
maximization in neoclassical economics is a metaphysical statement subject to 
neither logical nor empirical criticism. Boland replies to those sorts of criticisms 
along the lines that inductive proofs are not necessary for true knowledge, and true 
knowledge is not necessary for successful or determinate decision-making. Yet, 
this argument does not undermine the kernel of our claim, for what we dispute is 
not the logical consistency of the maximization hypothesis as such, but rather its 
generality. More precisely, what we dispute is the Cartesian-Euclidean search for 
an all-encompassing microfounding framework, be it maximization-based or not. 
To a certain extent, we agree with Boland’s claim that no logical criticism of 
                                           
8 An excellent discussion of the philosophical aspects of quantum mechanics may be found in Gibbins (1987). 
9 Keynes once noted that unlike physics, such parts of economic theory as are expressible in mathematical form are 
extremely easy when compared with the economic interpretation of the complex and incompletely known facts of 
experience: “Professor Planck, of Berlin, the famous originator of the Quantum Theory, once remarked to me that 
in early life he had thought of studying economics, but had found it too difficult! Professor Planck could easily 
master the whole corpus of mathematical economics in a few days. He did not mean that! But the amalgam of logic 
and intuition and the wide knowledge of facts, most of which are not precise, which is required for economic 
interpretation in its highest form is, quite truly, overwhelmingly difficult for those whose gift mainly consists in the 
power to imagine and pursue to their furthest point the implications and prior conditions of comparatively simple 




maximization can ever convince a neoclassical theorist that there is something 
intrinsically wrong with the maximization hypothesis, simply because there is not. 
Besides, we also agree with his contention that whether maximization should be 
part of anyone’s metaphysics is a methodological problem, for the kernel of our 
claim is that it is precisely the methodological dissonance between micro and 
macro that renders the notion of a single microfounding framework a mythical one. 
As Boland correctly put it, any sound criticism of neoclassical maximization must 
deal with neoclassical methodology rather than the true of the assumption. 
Therefore, the kernel of our claim - that is, the problem resides in the neoclassical 
notion that only a microfounding framework based upon maximization is 
methodologically sound - clearly follows Boland’s own prescription.    
 At this juncture, a question that deserves mention regards the extent to 
which the methodological dissonance between micro and macro can be seen as a 
particular feature of the “postmodern condition” of contemporary economics. More 
precisely, one might well suggest that economics has not been immune to the 
postmodern condition which, according to the work of Jean-François Lyotard 
(1984) and others, refers to the sense of “incommensurability” concerning the 
“condition of knowledge” within contemporary culture.
10 The question that arises 
here regards to what extent, if any, the micro-macro methodological dissonance 
can be conceived as being at the root of the sense of “incommensurability” that 
renders the “modernist” search for a single, time-invariant and trans-historical 
microfounding framework a vain exercise. Postmodernism in this usage refers to a 
position from which some of the primary conceptual values that, combined, have 
served as the “metanarrative” of modernist science - the possibility of certain 
knowledge defined as a relationship between a knowing subject and the object it 
seeks to know, the role of Reason in establishing the universal meanings through 
which that knowledge can be discovered and communicated, the idea that “Man” is 
the proper origin and object of that knowledge, and much else - are bracketed and 
called into question. Instead, postmodernism focuses on and emphasizes the 
discursivity and plurality of knowledge - and thus the potential 
“incommensurability” of such different knowledges - as well as related sensibilities 
of the fragmentary, discontinuous, undecidable, contextual, and decentering 
(Amariglio and Ruccio 1994). Hence, the claim that macrotheories are standing in 
shifting sands unless they are provided with neoclassical microfoundations would 
represent a (modernist) centering discourse. In turn, our contention that is not 
possible to provide a single microfoundation for macro, or, that it is unsound to try 
to unify economics in a modernist way would be a typically postmodernist stand. It 
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is in this sense that we would suggest that the microfoundations debate has been 
taking place in an essentially modernist fashion within the mainstream: Keynes’ 
macroeconomics is seen as a decentering moment whose understanding requires its 
reduction to a well-defined center, namely, neoclassical microtheory. We elaborate 
both on the microfoundations debate within the mainstream and on the question of 
the extent to which macrotheories really need microfoundations in the following 
sections.  
III. Keynes’ plea for relativism and pluralism in the (re)birth of 
macroeconomics 
After looking back over the last three hundred years of economic theorizing, 
one identifies two broad types of questions as have being dominating discussion. 
The first to emerge, which occupied classical political economists, dealt with 
growth and development; the second, which occupied neoclassical economists, 
dealt with the efficient allocation of given resources. In the latter, the treatment of 
efficiency has always started from the rational behavior of single individuals, 
especially with reference to consumption. In the classical analysis, in turn, the 
economy is not the mere collection of individuals and the main question is not that 
of the coordination of their activities in exchange. Rather, the main issue regards 
the mechanisms of creation of wealth related to the structure of income 
distribution. Such analysis was carried out without any reference to individual 
behaviors, so that the emphasis on classes in classical political economy is a clear 
departure from the methodological individualism of neoclassical analysis. 
However, it is not correct to claim either that there is not microfoundations in 
classical political economy, or that this project started with the marginalist 
revolution.
11 
It was only when the classical approach was superseded by the emergence of 
neoclassical analysis at the end of the last century that the marginal revolution 
wrenched value theory from the macroeconomic inquiry of the classical political 
economists to the microeconomic sphere of the neoclassical marginal analysis. The 
classical political economists were primarily macroeconomists and only a Keynes 
would have been needed to put their theoretical structure in order, their 
specificities notwithstanding. It is in this sense that we would suggest that the 
Keynesian revolution gave macroeconomics its rebirth. Keynes' expression of a 
monetary economy in historical time brought out the problem of the conflict 
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between individuals' desired actions and aggregate results. In addition to his 
emphasis on the organic interdependence of the system, one of Keynes' main 
contributions was the classification of economic variables into what has become 
the standard national income accounts, the basis of that classification involving the 
division of the economy into sectors and the analysis of the flow of income in an 
interdependent system. 
Hence, macrotheory is as old as economic theory, for whenever the latter 
devoted to some issue related to the economy as a whole, the ensuing analysis 
could be considered, using our modern jargon anachronistically, macroanalysis. 
But a clear distinction between micro and macro was introduced by Keynes, who 
was the first to conceive of macroeconomics as an autonomous discipline. To a 
certain extent, Keynes solved the apparent contradiction between the 'two faces of 
the moon' by liberating the macro from the traditional micro, thus showing that part 
of the neoclassical microfounding structure could be used to ground a 
macroanalysis leading to alternative results. It is in this sense that we would argue 
that implicit in Keynes’ macroeconomics is a methodological plea for the 
emancipation of macroanalysis from a single and time-invariant microfounding 
framework. Keynes developed a new autonomous discipline which he christened 
macro, and the discontinuity between micro and macro required a move like that. 
To a certain extent, Keynes was led to make macro autonomous precisely because 
the notion of an all-encompassing, time-invariant framework combining micro and 
macro lacks methodological soundness. 
Keynes was the originator of macroeconomics as a distinct topic, and 
contrasted such theory to the standard theory of his day, which analyzed the 
determination of prices and quantities of individual commodities in particular 
markets, industries and sectors. To a certain extent, he would have done much 
better to use either monopolistic competition or imperfect competition as the 
microfoundation of his macrotheory. By going along with pure competition, 
though, Keynes implicitly suggested that macrotheory is an analytical structure 
which is fully compatible, on logical grounds, with multiple microfounding 
frameworks. Moreover, one of the Keynes' main messages, however implicit, is 
that we should not concern too exclusively about providing macrotheory with 
rigorous and precise microfoundations, for the macrofoundations of microtheory 
may be just as important, if not more important, as the microfoundations of 
macrotheory. Like Marx and Kalecki, for instance, Keynes always had at the back 
of his mind the simple but profound insight that the whole may be more than the 
sum of the parts, that the macrofoundations of micro are as important as the 




which rational behavior at the micro level creates irrational macroeconomic 
outcomes abound in his writings.
12 
Not surprisingly, Hayek’s capital-theoretic objections to Keynes’ 
macroeconomic project were against macro as such rather than just Keynes’ way of 
macrotheorizing. Hayek strongly rejected the core idea of macroeconomics, 
namely, the existence of stable relationships among aggregate variables. Indeed, 
much of his critique of Keynes, which first surfaced in the controversy over the 
Treatise on Money, concerned the conceptual validity of the notion of aggregate 
demand. For Hayek, macro variables are epiphenomena whose movement masks 
the micro forces that alone can explain them. For Keynes, in turn, given the 
complexities of building a complete micro-macro system, it is nevertheless 
legitimate to analyse behavior in terms of aggregates (Lima 1994b).There are 
sufficient regularities between the chosen aggregates to allow valid theorizing, 
which means that it is acceptable to have different chains of logic which do not 
necessarily stem from a common set of axioms regarding the smallest unit of 
analysis. 
IV. Do macrotheories really need microfoundations? 
At this juncture, it is worthy of some discussion the question of to what 
extent, if any, microfoundations are really needed to attach epistemological validity 
to macrotheories. Phrased another way, one might well wonder to what extent, if 
any, macrotheories would be really standing on shifting sands if they were not 
provided with explicit microfoundations. In our view, micro and macro should be 
seen not as competing theories, but as partial theories with restricted and different 
research programs. Even though they overlap insofar as both of them deal with the 
global economy, they are different and particular theories as regards the problems 
and perspectives which each of them stresses. Hence, one might well venture that 
there is no sound logical justification for a hierarchical stipulation that 
macrotheories do require microfoundations to obtain full epistemological validity, 
for one could just as well demand a macrofoundation for microtheory whenever the 
latter does not fit macro phenomena into its own framework.  
 
In this sense, one might well wonder to what extent macrotheory as such 
needs microfoundations. In fact, the terms in which the microfoundations debate 
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has usually been posed in some sense begs the question. It is argued that since 
macrotheory is aggregate economics, and aggregates are always aggregate of 
smaller units, macrotheory must be grounded on microfoundations. But economic 
theory has not always posed its problems, or constructed its methods, in such 
Cartesian terms. For instance, neither the classical economists nor Marx developed 
their theories of the long run development of a capitalist economy as a construction 
out theories of individual behavior. Indeed, the micro-macro distinction would not 
have made much sense to them. For those economists, individual behavior took its 
meaning and motivation from its social context, the development of which the 
theory explained, so that the theory of the whole was prior to the theory of the 
individual. For instance, an individual's spending pattern would be conditioned by 
his or her social class, which in turn was defined by the relationships in production, 
while the long-run development of the economy explained the changing relative 
prosperity of the social classes. Moreover, the notion of individual preferences that 
are independent of the economic changes under investigation is meaningless, for 
those preferences are socially constructed. Indeed, economic pressures shape 
individual preferences and define the social positions in which individuals make 
their choices. It is in this sense that one might well venture that it may be the case 
that macrotheory, conceived as the theory of the functioning of the economy as a 
whole, needs no microfoundation in the theoretical sense, but could well rest 
empirically on detailed institutional studies. Macroeconomics matters at its own 
level in the hierarchy of theories, and the regularities and stylized facts one builds 
into macromodels require justification much more from historical and institutional 
analysis (some microeconomic) than from optimization games that idealized firms 
or households are supposed to play. 
In other words, one might well venture that in some sense macroeconomic 
relations can be seen as experiencing a life of their own, thus being logically 
independent of micro units. For a suggestion might be made that macro relations 
are a complex manifestation of an overdetermined process of mutual constitutivity 
among a myriad of isolated units, thus rendering meaningless the notion that there 
is a single and definite relationship between the aggregate and an individual unit. 
Granted that the micro and the macro spheres of the economy are overdetermined, 
a question that arises regards what are the logical implications of the prevalence of 
such regime of mutual constitutivity for the microfoundations issue. From an 
overdeterministic perspective, micro instances of the economy are just as 
determinant upon macro ones as the latter participate in determining, or rather, 
overdetermining the former. In this sense, we would argue that an 




thus pluralism as far as microfoundation (and macrofoundation, for that matter) 
issues are concerned.
13  
It is clear that macroeconomics, by its very nature, involves aggregation. 
However, aggregation problems are complicated ones. In the traditional analysis, 
the aggregate economy is pictured as a composite of millions of individual 
decision-makers, and implicitly analyzed through the eyes of an imaginary 
representative individual seen independently of the aggregate economy. But the 
presumption that the Marshallian notion that the economy is a large-scale replica of 
a representative individual is the most adequate vehicle for microfounding 
macrotheories is quite problematic. As Stiglitz (1992) noted, the use of  
representative agents in macromodels has serious drawbacks. First, they are of 
limited use in investigating problems arising from information asymmetries and 
coordination failures. Presumably, asymmetric information could be reconciled 
with a representative agent model only by assuming a particular kind of 
schizophrenia on the part of the representative agent. Second, if one believes that 
some kinds of market failures are at the root of macroeconomic phenomena, one 
can hardly study these issues by using representative agents models. For when all 
individuals are identical, there is no need for trades, and hence there are no 
consequences of the absence of markets. Thus, the heroic assumption that the 
decision-makers of the macromodels are representative agents whose behaviour 
fairly well approximates the aggregate behaviour of the economy ultimately 
assumes away a basic subject that should be dealt with in macrotheory, namely, 
aggregation problems and failures of coordination between the behaviour of 
individuals. 
Moreover, the results derived by Debreu (1974), Mantel (1976), and 
Sonnenschein (1972, 1973), hereafter SMD results, which show that any set of 
market excess demand functions satisfying Walras' law can be derived from utility-
maximizing individual, cannot but make one even more skeptical of the usefulness 
of the representative agent model for macrotheory. Essentially, these results show 
that the neoclassical rationality hypothesis puts no restriction on observed 
behaviour; individual optimization (i.e. microeconomic rationality) placing no 
restriction on aggregate excess demand. However, when economists argue that a 
particular parameterization of behaviour should be derived from microeconomic 
principles, it is meant that that parameterization can be derived as the behaviour of 
a single individual. But as Stiglitz (1992) reminded us, the SMD results show that 
there is no logical reason why the economy should behave as if there were a single 
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individual. Based upon SMD results, Kirman (1989), an author far from hostile to 
neoclassicism, recognized that the notion that a coherent economic analysis should 
start at the level of the isolated individual is problematic, which means that to 
microfound macrotheories using independent individuals is misleading. As Kirman 
(1992) more recently put it, the representative agent is simply another attempt to 
circumvent the fact that while neoclassical macroeconomists generally want 
microfoundations based on individual maximizing agents, maximizing behaviour 
does not impose any restrictions on aggregate excess demands that would 
guarantee stability or uniqueness. In the same vein, Grandmont (1992), another 
insider to these debates, concluded that efforts to provide systematic theoretical 
microfoundations to macrotheories through models involving a single optimizing 
representative agent are quite misleading. It is thus hardly surprising that some 
recent mainstream attempts to avoid the implications of the SMD impossibility 
theorem have a more holistic flavor.
14  
V. Season finale: who is afraid of alternative microfounding frameworks? 
In addition to disputing on methodological grounds the plea for a single, 
time-invariant microfounding framework, we bring forward some alternative 
macroeconomic formulations that cannot be charged, logically speaking, for the 
lack of sound microfoundations, thus showing that that plea is not a value-free 
claim. Our purpose is to persuade the reader to see a neoclassical framework (or 
any other, for that matter) as one methodological alternative, rather than the only 
one, in terms of microfounding structure that can provide macrotheories with 
sound microfoundations whenever these are required.  
A primal example of the possibility of building consistent and coherent 
macromodels with sound alternative microfoundations is provided by Kalecki’s 
contributions. Kalecki made little use of, and was actually hostile to, neoclassical 
analysis, with its concepts of marginal productivity and general equilibrium. He 
made no use of utility or production functions, not having assumed optimizing 
behavior either. But this does not necessarily (meaning logically) mean that 
Kalecki's macroeconomic conclusions lack sound microfoundations. Kalecki's 
mark-up pricing theory, for instance, consistently and coherently shows how the 
pricing decisions of individual firms operating in an oligopolistic setting lead to 
macroeconomic variables such as output and employment to behave accordingly. 
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Kalecki's macromodels have an underlying non-neoclassical microbehavior which 
is logically compatible with the macro results obtained; there is nothing 
intrinsically distinctive about the micro-macro connection established by Kalecki 
that renders it logically inconsistent. 
In turn, to accord a role to mark-up pricing in macromodels leading to 
alternative microfoundations implies to recognize that the price system plays a 
broader role than that envisaged in the mainstream. While the only role played the 
price system within neoclassicism is the allocative one, a relativistic and thus 
pluralistic approach to the microfoundations issue should conceive it as playing 
other roles. Given the supremacy of the notion of exchange in the neoclassical 
microfounding framework, it is hardly surprising that that role is so narrowly 
conceived. As Gerrard (1989) put it, prices have (at least) five roles in a capitalist 
economy. The conductive role relates to the passing on of costs as prices (with the 
addition of a mark-up) and in the case of workers the passing on of prices as 
wages. The positional role concerns the relativity of one economic agent with 
another: in the labour sector, for instance, this has been seen as particularly 
important for groups of workers relative to other groups. The strategic role of 
prices results from the need of firms to develop competitive strategies with which 
to achieve their marketing objectives in the face of competitive strategies adopted 
by their rivals, the setting of a limit-price to deter new entrants being an example of 
the strategic role of prices. The financial role, in turn, enables firms to generate 
sufficient funds for their investment and other objectives, Eichner’s (1973) notion 
that firms adjust profit margins so as to generate internal finance for investment 
being an example of this role. 
Truly enough,  mark-up pricing can be easily derived from optimizing 
principles (Dutt 1990). In fact, Kalecki (1939-40) himself provided the basis for 
such an interpretation of mark-up pricing. He latter gave up such attempts, for 
these theoretical excursions were only a digression (Kriesler 1987). For instance, 
one might well assume that the mark-up is determined by profit maximization in 
the manner suggested by Cowling and Waterson (1976), where it is assumed that 
there are n firms in the industry and that firms aim to maximize profits subject to 
well-defined cost conditions and to their conjectured demand conditions. Along 
similar lines, Lavoie (1989) shows that under certain conditions, in particular when 
the price elasticity of demand is greater than one, mark-up pricing is easily 
derivable from profit maximization. Agliardi (1988), in turn, uses a maximizing 
framework to demonstrate that this pricing behavior may arise from a Bayesian 
process of learning. The moral of this literature is that the consistency of a 
macromodel based on mark-up pricing is logically independent of the latter being 




showing the relativistic nature of a given microfounding structure. Hence, to 
dismiss mark-up pricing on the grounds that it is an ad hoc assumption unless it is 
based on maximizing behavior is in fact a clearly ad hoc way of justifying the 
logical necessity of searching for a single microfounding framework. 
Besides, the type of macroeconomic structure that prevails in an economy at 
a given point of time depends on the historical and institutional conditions, in the 
sense that the macroeconomic structure is a product of history as well as of 
institutional design. Macrotheory follows a primarily historical-inductive method 
because the macro structure of a society is historically as well as institutionally 
determined, thus rendering an overly single and deterministic specification of the 
prevailing macro relationships a reductionist analytical procedure. Though 
neoclassical economists do not necessarily deny the influence of institutional and 
historical factors on individual behavior, it is implied that such influence can be 
analyzed only through the effects on the preferences and initial endowments of 
those individual agents. Institutions are usually seen as the optimal outcome of a 
maximizing procedure on the part of nature, which maximizes the scope for 
optimal decisions on the part of individuals. It is thus hardly surprising that to learn 
more optimization mathematics is considered more important than to learn about 
history and institutions within the mainstream.In Lucas’ (1981) view, for instance, 
though the time pattern of hours that an individual supplies to the market is 
admitted to be affected by social convention and institutional structures, it is 
argued that conventions and institutions do not simply come out of the blue. On the 
contrary, institutions and customs are designed precisely in order to aid in 
matching preferences and opportunities satisfactorily. But as Skott (1989) replied, 
Lucas seems unaware of the problems involved in the infinite regress - individual 
behavior being affected by institutions being affected by individual behavior, and 
so forth - which could equally well support a sort of holistic methodological 
institutionalism.   
 In this context, reference should be made to the suggestive contribution by 
Lavoie (1992), which shows that a consistent theory of household choice can be 
built upon the substantial role played by habits and social conventions, by 
procedural (meaning bounded) rationality and a more proper psychological 
foundation than that used by neoclassical theory. For Lavoie, when they take 
decisions, or even when they set their preferences, both entrepreneurs and 
households rely on habits, conventions and norms. This means that when 
proceeding to analyse the economy as a whole, we can dispense with going into the 
intricate details of individual behaviour and content ourselves with the study of the 
interaction between the various groups and classes of society based on the received 




thumb, such as mark-ups, standard rates of utilization, propensities to consume, 
and so on, are perfectly legitimate since they rely on a type of rationality which is 
appropriate for the usual economic environment; in a world of uncertainty and of 
limited computational abilities, the economic agent cannot but adopt, except in the 
simplest of problems, a rationality which of the procedural type. Models built on 
rules of thumb are not ad hoc constructions. Rather, they reflect the rationality of 
reasonable agents. As such they have microfoundations which are just as solid, if 
not more from a realist point of view, as those of the standard mainstream models. 
There is thus no need to demonstrate that such or such element results from some 
maximizing procedure. Indeed, optimizing procedures may well have some 
legitimacy when the problems to be solved are simple, but they describe neither the 
means nor the results of rational economic behaviour under the more realistic 
conditions of uncertainty or of limited information processing
15 
As regards the logical consistency of the notion of conventional behavior, 
reference should also be made to the contribution by Tokeshi (1991), who shows 
that a macrotheory of inflation can be provided with sound microfoundations 
without resorting to any optimizing framework. More precisely, he provides 
logically sound microfoundations to the theory of inertial inflation developed by 
some Brazilian economists using Keynes’ notion of conventional behavior in the 
presence of uncertainty. Informal indexation is shown to be a rational behavior in 
chronically inflationary situations, and the rigidity of this kind of behavior is 
shown to be an equally rational procedure. Given the uncertainty surrounding the 
pricing decisions in an economy with high and chronic inflation, indexation 
emerges as a rational decision rule. If the demand for microfoundations rests on the 
(correct) argument that the individual decision process should be fully and 
logically specified, it is hardly denying that Tokeshi’s contribution meets such 
requirement. As regards a possible reply that his emphasis on conventions and 
bounded rationality is ad hoc, simply because it was not derived from standard 
neoclassical axioms about individual behavior, we would readily rejoin that ad 
hocery is in fact involved in that potential reply, for the pedestrian reason that it is 
intended to preserve the alleged universality of the standard microfounding 
framework.  
                                           
15 In the recent mainstream literature, reference should be made to a contribution by Choi (1993), who presents a 
conventions-based alternative to the standard approach of a rational maximizing model. Using a game-theoretic 
framework, his basic conclusion is that utility maximization is hardly a general theory of humanity and society: 
“Maximization simply cannot be a model of individual decision-making in the face of uncertainty. Surely, the idea 
of utility-maximizing consumers conjures up an image of rational decision makers. But securing the rationality of 
choices requires a heroic amount of assumptions that either ignore or take as given what is important in decision-




In our view, what these alternative formulations show is that to insist on a 
single microfounding framework is to contribute to the enlargement of the gulf 
between academic macrotheory and policy-oriented macroeconomics. There is no 
dispute on the relevance of academic macrotheory as an important source of 
theoretical background for practical macroeconomics. Yet, such role as provider of 
sound theoretical foundations for macropolicy is condemned to be the less 
effective the greater is the insistence on following a single microfounding 
framework. The insistence in viewing the economic system as a fully rational and 
logical system, and economy theory as a model that provides a single and fully 
encompassing explanation for the whole system is unrealistic if not arrogant. If we 
conceive economics as providing various approaches, using different methods, and 
reaching conclusions which are  not necessarily consistent ones, we will be closer 
to the truth that scientific method looks for. Micro theory and macro theory use 
different methods and illuminate different angles of the economic system. To 
reduce one to the other or vice-versa will just represent a loss to our understanding 
of economic reality. 
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